The Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) provides a unique organizational structure that capitalizes on the force multiplier effect realized from an entity staffed and led by personnel from multiple agencies with one common commander and mission. Though ideally suited for the detection, monitoring and interdiction of illicit transnational threats, a JIATFs efficiency and unity of effort can be hampered by certain legacy impediments placed upon them. One such impediment is identified in the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP). The current NICCP states "the areas of responsibility (AORs) for the JIATF will mirror those of their respective Combatant Commanders (COCOMS) as defined by the Unified Command Plan (UCP); the JIATF West AOR will mirror that of USPACOM, and the AOR of JIATF East will mirror that of USSOUTHCOM." These two regional COCOMs share a common boundary in the eastern Pacific located at 92 degrees West longitude. This common boundary or "seam" has created an area where highly integrated planning, communication, and coordination are required to conduct the most basic of operational objectives. This study serves three purposes. First, through real world operations in JIATF East and JIATF West, it will demonstrate the corrosive effect of the current NICCP JIATF AOR boundary on unity of effort in counterdrug operations. Second, it will illustrate why the NICCP JIATF AOR boundary must change to enhance mission efficiency and ensure unity of effort. Finally, it will present two courses of action for mitigating the current erosion in unity of effort in counterdrug operations. This study serves three purposes. First, through real world operations in JIATF East and JIATF West, it will demonstrate the corrosive effect of the current NICCP JIATF AOR boundary on unity of effort in counterdrug operations. Second, it will illustrate why the NICCP JIATF AOR boundary must change to enhance mission efficiency and ensure unity of effort. Finally, it will present two courses of action for mitigating the current erosion in unity of effort in counterdrug operations.
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This study serves three purposes. First, through real world operations in JIATF East and JIATF West, it will demonstrate the corrosive effect of the current NICCP JIATF AOR boundary on unity of effort in counterdrug operations. Second, it will illustrate why the NICCP JIATF AOR boundary must change to enhance mission efficiency and ensure unity of effort. Finally, it will present two courses of action for mitigating the current erosion in unity of effort in counterdrug operations.
INTRODUCTION
The involvement of the Department of Defense (DOD) in counterdrug operations began over twenty years ago when the Reagan Administration designated drug abuse a threat to National Security and formally declared a "war" on drugs.
1 Since this declaration, national counterdrug strategy has continued to develop and shift in response to actual world events and the ever-changing tactics utilized by transnational drug traffickers. These changes have forced DOD and the national agencies that wage this war to transform themselves to meet each new challenge. On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush renewed this commitment stating, "Illegal narcotics trafficking constitute a serious threat to the health and well-being of individuals and to international security as a whole. The drug trade is one of the principle sources of financial support for international terrorism." 2 Although there has been a recognized link between illicit drugs and terrorism, the attacks of September 11, 2001 have served as the catalyst for refocusing our national agenda on countering the trafficking of illicit narco-terrorism operations in order to protect the homeland. This national reprioritization has led directly to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003. The essential mission for the DHS is to protect the homeland, its borders, and territorial waters from these transnational threats. The JIATF provides a unique organizational structure that capitalizes on the force multiplier effect realized from an entity staffed and led by personnel from multiple agencies with one common commander and mission. Though ideally suited for this new mission, the JIATF's efficiency and unity of effort can be hampered by certain legacy impediments placed upon them. One such impediment is identified in the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP). The current NICCP states "the areas of responsibility (AORs) for the JIATF will mirror those of their respective Combatant Commanders (COCOMS) as defined by the Unified Command Plan (UCP); the JIATF West AOR will mirror that of USPACOM, and the AOR of JIATF East will mirror that of USSOUTHCOM. This study serves three purposes. First, through real world operations in JIATF East and JIATF West, it will demonstrate the corrosive effect of the current NICCP JIATF boundary on unity of effort in counterdrug operations. Second, it will illustrate why the NICCP JIATF AOR boundary must change to enhance mission efficiency and ensure unity of effort. Finally, it will present two courses of action for mitigating the current erosion in unity of effort in counterdrug operations.
This study is limited to only those issues concerning the 92 degree West longitude seam between USSOUTHCOM and USPACOM. It does not address the potential implications posed by the formation of USNORTHCOM which was established by the 2002 UCP. Although USNORTHCOMs AOR will create additional seams effecting JIATF operations, the command is currently in the process of defining its mission subsets and will not be fully operational until sometime in late FY-04. 6 However, the issues and courses of action (COAs) presented within the scope of this study will continue to apply to any USNORTHCOM seams created by its establishment.
DOD COUNTERDRUG EVOLUTION
DOD has been involved in what is commonly referred to as the "war" on drugs since The national counterdrug community also agreed.
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In 1994, ONDCP reorganized its interdiction efforts by producing the first National
Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP). This plan was created to define the responsibilities of the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) and to consolidate interagency efforts into a more cohesive command and control structure. 13 Utilizing the previously created JTF's as a springboard, the new NICCP created three JIATFs and one Domestic Air
Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC), each responsible for the conduct and coordination of specific portions of the drug interdiction process. These organizations were designed as "national" task forces, and not department or agency task forces. The "national" concept provided for an organizational structure, which recognized the force multiplier effect that could be realized from a task force manned and led by personnel from various agencies with a drug interdiction mission. 
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
The national objectives for the war on drugs are ultimately issued from the National Security Strategy (NSS). The objectives of the NSS are to enhance America's economic prosperity and promote democracy and human rights abroad. 21 Furthermore, the NSS specifically states the national objectives related to illicit drug trafficking to be: 1) Shield America's border from drug trafficking; and 2) Break the drug trafficker's sources of supply.
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OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES
The JIATF mission is based on the NSS objectives with concentration on the illegal flow of drugs from the source nation, transit zone, and arrival nation of the transnational drug shipment. Although imperfect, JIATFs "represent the U.S. Government's best hope that it could defy operational lines of demarcation and agency stove pipes and blend capabilities of various agencies and military services into one synergistic whole. and MOOTW are unity of command and unity of effort. In MOOTW, unity of command is more difficult to attain because command arrangements are often loosely defined and not involve the same level of command authority as within the military. JIATFs were created to attain both unity of command and unity of effort by melding together the resources of all participating agencies for execution of the counterdrug strategy under one single unified commander. 25 Although this establishes "who" is in command, "JIATF commanders are faced with multiple challenges when establishing unity of effort among disparate units." 26 Moreover, "operational commanders must seek an atmosphere of cooperation, trust and understanding to achieve objectives by unity of effort." 27 Unity of effort fundamentally means that in every operation, all agencies are directed to a common purpose at all levels. In order to achieve a common purpose at all levels, JIATF commanders must effectively communicate and coordinate mission objectives to all the supporting agencies under his jurisdiction.
The current NICCP states "the AORs for the JIATFs will mirror those of their respective COCOMs as defined by the UCP; the JIATF West AOR will mirror that of USPACOM, and the AOR of JIATF East will mirror that of USSOUTHCOM." 28 The end result -while JIATF West seized 2.4 metric tons of cocaine, the Guatemalans were quite angry over the incident and questioned the U.S. ability to keep to their agreements. Although the operation was a tactical success, it was a political failure and resulted in the Guatemalans withdrawing from joint counterdrug operations for the foreseeable future. In addition, USSOUTHCOM's Theater Security Cooperation efforts with Guatemala suffered as a direct result of this operation. As an anecdotal point, approximately 50 percent of all the drug trafficking events within the last year crossed the MAYAN JAGUAR operational area in the Eastern Pacific. 37 The net result is that the action of one JIATF had a direct and lasting impact within another JIATF's AOR. By their very nature, every transnational drug shipment in the Eastern Pacific will cross the JIATF seam and the potential continues for more confusion and missed interdiction opportunities.
COURSE OF ACTION (COA)
Doctrinal guidance for DOD's support to counterdrug operations is delineated in Joint Although the analysis presented clearly illustrates the benefits of changing the NICCP JIATF seam, there seems to be a resistance to implement the change amongst senior DOD and Federal agency leaders. By leaving the seam in place, some commanders have "perceived" benefits they receive from this COA. These benefits are based on the premise that by maintaining the "business as usual" mentality, commanders will incur no change in their mission, manning levels, billet structure, asset apportionment, and risk associated with change. Historically, the Navy has been culturally resistant to change when that change involves risk of failure. As noted by Captain Dennis Flahety, "it is said that change is inherently the mother of all risk. Senior naval leadership have it bred into them that the 'zero defects' mentality is still part of naval command culture. Most senior commanders are not willing to voluntarily take those risks necessary to ferment change if their careers may suffer in the process. This unwillingness to assume risk can prevent us from being victorious in the asymmetric environment that we find ourselves in the 21 st century." 38 If senior leadership allow themselves to be culturally paralyzed from this zero defect mentality, the fear of failure in a highly competitive environment will hinder the implementation of new and creative COAs on the asymmetric threat facing us today. An area for future study to alleviate these disadvantages would be the establishment of a Western Hemispheric JIATF (JIATF-WHEM). By merging JIATF East and JIATF West, one JIATF commander, dual hatted to two regional COCOMs (USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM) can operate seamlessly across UCP boundaries. Although this offers the best long-term solution to the problem, its implementation is impractical until the mission subsets of USNORTHCOM have been clearly defined. However, the establishment of JIATF-WHEM would provide for the epitome of "seamless" narco-terrorism operations throughout the Western Hemisphere.
CONCLUSION
In a time when our military is shrinking and illicit transnational operations threaten our homeland; our national leaders must use every instrument of national power to defeat this peril. The JIATF process is best suited for this mission by bringing all the tools of national power together to combat this evolving threat. JIATFs provide our nation's best hope in defying operational lines of separation and blending the unique capabilities of various agencies and military services into one synergistic whole. Though ideally suited for this new mission, a JIATFs efficiency and unity of effort can be hampered by any legacy impediments placed upon them. As this study has illustrated, the NICCP boundary has engendered operational inefficiencies and eroded unity of effort. Our national leaders must not allow political, cultural or bureaucratic rice bowls to dictate how to solve this problem. The establishment of a JOA is doctrinally the correct solution in this situation and the best course of action for the JIATFs to achieve national objectives. The proposed JIATF East JOA will provide seamless interagency operations for the entire Eastern Pacific region and significantly reduce inefficiency and maximize unity of effort.
